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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VINCENT DYKES, by and through 
Neil F'arrell Dykes, his Guardian ad 
Litem, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
RELIABLE F'URNITURE & 
CARPET COMPANY, 
Defendant and Third-
Party Plaitntiff and 
Respondp,nt, 
-vs.-
WALKER :M:ANUF ACTURING 
COMPANY, 
Third Party Defenda;nt 
and Appellant. 
Case No. 8179 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
- j 
In order to avoid confusion, we will adopt the pro-
cedure followed by the appellant and will refer to the 
parties as they are designated in the pleadings filed in 
the Lower Court. 
Plaintiff, a minor, brought this action against the 
Reliable Furniture and Carpet Company to recover for 
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personal injuries alleged to have been received in a fall 
from a baby crib sold by the defendant Reliable Furni-
ture and Carpet Company to the minor's parents. It is 
alleged that the crib was defective and that the defect 
W8JS the cause of the plaintiff's fall and injuries. 
Defendant, after securing permission of the court 
to do so, filed a third party complaint against the Walker 
Manufacturing Company, the manufacturer of the crib. 
While not admitting that the baby crib was defective, de-
fendant alleged that if the same was defective, the de-
fect was not apparent and was the fault of the Walker 
Manufacturing Company, from whom the crib was pur-
chased by the defendant (R. 2-4). The third party sum-
mons and complaint was served upon Harland Fredrick-
son in the State of Utah, who it is claimed is the agent for 
the Walker Manufacturing Company in this state (R. 7). 
The third party defendant has moved to dismiss the 
third party complaint upon the grounds that service upon 
Harland Fredrickson does not constitute valid service 
upon the Walker Manufacturing Company (R. 8). 
Rule 4 (e) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide for service of. summons as follows : 
"Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise 
provided for, upon a partnership or other unin-
corporated association which is subject to suit 
under a common name, by delivering a copy 
thereof to an officer, a managing or general 
agent, or to any other agent authorized by ap-
pointment or by law to receive service of process 
and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to 
receive service and the statute so requires, by also 
mailing a copy to the defendant. If no such officer 
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or agent can be found in the county in which the 
action is brought, then upon any such officer or 
agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief 
clerk, or other agent having the management, di-
rection or control of any property of such corpo-
ration, partnership or other unincorporated as-
sociation within the state. If no such officer or 
agent can be found in the state, and the defendant 
has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, 
an office or place of business in this state, or does 
business in this state, then upon the person doing 
such business or in charge of such office or place 
of business." 
Rule 4 (e) ( 10) provides : 
"Upon a natural person, nonresident of the 
state of Utah, doing business in this state at one 
or more place of business, as set forth in Rule 17 
(e), by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant 
personally or to one of his managers, superintend-
ents or agents." 
The court denied the third party defendant's motion 
to dismiss the third party complaint. This appeal is 
taken from the court's ruling in this regard. The ques-
tion presented is: Is the service upon Harland Fred-
rickson sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the Walker 
Manufacturing Company upon the court~ 
The appellant attempts to raise another issue, which 
is: "Said third party complaint states no claim and pre-
sents no issue upon which relief could be granted against 
said third party defendant in favor of said third party 
plaintiff." 
This issue should not be considered by this court on 
this appeal for the reason that it was never submitted 
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to the Trial Court. The 1notion which was filed by the 
third party defendant-and which was denied by the Dis-
trict Court appears on page 3 of its brief and is as fol-
lows: 
"To dismiss the third party action or in lieu. 
thereof to quash the return of service of the third 
party summons on the grounds (a) that the court 
lacks jurisdiction over the person of said third 
party defendant, and (b) that said third party de-
fendant has not been properly served with pro-
cess in this action, all of which more clearly ap-
pears in the affidavits of Sam Walker and Har-
land Fredrickson hereto annexed as Exhibit "A" 
and Exhibit "B", respectively." (R. 8). 
Thus it was seen that the second point raised by the 
appellant in his brief was never presented to the Dis-
trict Court and should be denied or not even considered 
by this court upon that basis. However, since the issue 
has been raised in appellant's brief, we will discuss the 
same herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The fundamental question involved is whether or 
not Harland Fredrickson is the agent of the Walker 
Manufacturing Company in this state, upon whom service 
of summons may be made. His deposition has been taken 
and discloses the following: 
The Walker Manufacturing Company manufactures 
infant furniture, including baby cribs (Dep. 5). It manu-
factures the same line of products which was formerly 
manufactured by the Tyre Manufacturing Company and 
then the Walker Manufacturing Company for a number 
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of years. Although Harland Fredrickson has no formal 
written agreement with the company, he, at the time of 
the service of summons upon him was the only repre-
sentative of the Walker Manufacturing Company in the 
State of Utah (Dep. 12). On page 7 of the deposition, 
Mr. Fredrickson testified as follows: 
"Q. Not referring to this particular transaction 
but just to a transaction generally, you did 
represent the Walker Manufacturing Com-
pany in January 19531 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you did represent them during the year 
1952. Is that correct 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how many years back does that repre-
sentation go 1 
A. Well, originally the company, or not this 
company in particular, was known as the 
Tyre Manufacturing Company. However, 
they decided here several years back to manu-
facture other items, and Mr. Walker had fi-
nancing through the Tyre company, and he 
decided to manufacture these cribs; and up 
until the first of-well, let's see-I would 
imagine about the first of February the man-
ufacturing company was known as Tyre. 
Q. The first of February of what year1 
A. Of this year." 
Upon inquiry to the company from a person in this 
area, Mr. Fredrickson's name would be furnished by the 
company as the company's representative (Dep. 10). On 
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page 10 of the deposition, he testified : 
"Q. Does the Walker Manufacturing Company or 
did the company that preceded it, the Tyre 
company, furnish the people in the State of 
Utah such as the Reliable Furniture & Carpet 
Company who might buy their products the 
name of their representatives in various 
states! 
A. I would imagine so. 
Q. Did they furnish them your name as a repre-
sentative of the company! 
A. Well, it would happen in this case. If they 
should write the company and ask them who 
represented them or who had the pictures and 
so forth in order to show them what they 
manufactured, they would give my name. 
Q. And that would be true of the Reliable Furni-
ture & Carpet Company or any other com-
pany that happened to write the company and 
ask who represented them in this state. Is 
that correct~ 
A. Well, that's right. 
Q. Do they have any other representatives in 
this state other than yourself! 
A. No. 
Q. And is your territory or your field in which 
you may represent them limited to the State 
of Utah! 
A. Would you repeat that, please! 
Q. Is your territory or the locality in which you 
represent them limited to the State of Utah T 
A. No, it's unlimited. I could sell in New York 
if I wan ted to." 
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Continuing on page 12, Mr. Fredrickson testified: 
"Q. Do you have the exclusive right to represent 
the Walker Manufacturing Company here in 
the State of Utah~ 
A. I don't have that in writing, no. He could 
have somebody else up here tomorrow with-
out ever telling me about it. Of course, that 
is not a normal business procedure, but-
Q. Is it your understanding that you do have an 
exclusive right to represent them~ 
A. No, it isn't even that, because I can send his 
pictures and prices back to him and tell him 
I don't want to represent him any longer, and 
he can do the same thing for me. 
Q. I mean as long as the relationship continues 
on a friendly basis, as long as-
A. It would be assuming that I was his-the only 
person selling in this area for him, yes. 
Q. And would that same practice have prevailed 
during the time that it was known as the Tyre 
Manufacturing Company~ 
A. Yes." 
Although he represents a number of other com-
panies, he does not represent any other company selling 
the same items as the Walker Manufacturing Company 
(Dep. 28), and believes that the company would object to 
his representing another company and not allow him to 
represent it further (Dep. 27). 
The company furnished him with catalogues, bro-
chures, pictures of the items they sold, price lists and 
order blanks (Dep. 5-6). He contacts prospective retail 
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outlets such as defendant Reliable Furniture & Carpet 
Company, furnishes then1 with catalogues and other ma-
terials and shows them pictures of the items offered 
for sale. Assuming he is successful, he will take an order 
for the particular items desired, quoting the prices shown 
on the price lists (Dep. 17-18). This order will generally 
be taken on one of the company's order blanks and will 
then be forwarded to the company. 
The items ordered will be shipped directly from the 
company to the purchaser at the prices quoted by Fted-
rickson from the price lists. A notice that the item has 
been shipped, showing the price charged, is sent to Har-
land Ftedrickson (Dep. 19-20). At the close of each 
month, the company forwards him a commission of six 
percent on all sales during the preceding period. He re-
ceives this commission on all sales made by the company 
in this area, whether the order was taken by him per-
sonally or not (Dep. 26). 
The witness is kept advised of the status of the vari-
ous accounts, and in the event of a delinquency has au-
thority to speak to the customers about such delinquent 
accounts (Dep. 23). In the event payment was forth-
coming, he would suggest that payment be forwarded di-
rectly to the company, but does feel that he might accept 
payment and forward the same to the company (Dep. 
37). 
In the event complaints were made about any of the 
items sold by the company, he would go to the customer 
registering the complaint, with a representative of the 
store which sold the item (Dep. 38), 1nake an investiga-
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tion of the cmnplaint and forward a report of the srune 
to the company (Dep. 13 and 38). The stores to whom 
Harland Fredrickson sells, when they have a request 
for items which they do not have on hand, sold by the 
Walker Manufacturing Company, generally arrange 
among themselves to secure the items from one another; 
however, according to the witness, they could call the 
witness and he would refer them to another store where 
they might be able to obtain the desired item. 
As to his authority to make adjustments, Mr. Fred-
rickson testified on Page 13: 
"Q. Now, did the Walker Manufacturing Com-
pany have any service men in the State of 
Utah who serviced their products~ 
A. No. 
Q. If there were a particular item which they 
~old and the item happened not to be up to 
par, would there be anybody in the State of 
Utah whom they would call and have come 
and look over the equipment~ 
A. Well, in the event that some particular mech-
anism or crib panel or crib side or what have 
you proved dissatisfactory, the company 
would normally write to them for replace-
ment; and in the event that there was some 
discrepancy, the company would probably 
write me and tell me to go examine it or in-
spect it and ascertain what the damage was 
in that regard. That would be the only thing. 
Q. Would you have any authority in such cir-
cumstances to make an adjustment~ 
A. No, I couldn't make any adjustment of any 
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kind. All I could do was write the factory as 
to what I found, and then they would make 
the adjustment that they felt was satisfactory 
to both parties. 
Q. If you found the equipment to be defective, 
could you pick the equipment up and send it 
hack to the factory and have the factory send 
a replacement without writing-
A. It is never handled like that. In the event 
that the part was faulty, the normal course 
would be for the store to return it, or re-
order a particular part, and when they re-
ceived it, return the faulty one." 
And on Page 15 he testified : 
"Q. Do you go on behalf of the Walker Manu-
facturing Company when there are com-
plaints about their equipment to the home of 
the individual or to the store and make an in-
spection¥ 
A. I would go to the store only, and I would only 
go with one of the representatives of the store 
to look at the Inerchandise because, you see, 
I can never go to a person's home and look 
over some damaged merchandise by myself. 
Q. And after you have looked over this damaged 
merchandise, would you then make a report 
of your findings to the company¥ 
A. Well, see, as I say, that's the only thing I can 
do because I'm not authorized to make are-
pair of any kind. 
Q. If you decide that the particular fault that 
happened to exist in this particular product 
that you went to examine was not by reason 
of its faulty manufacture, would you then 
10 
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have to report it to the company, or could you 
just inform them of your findings 1 
A. Well, all I would do is tell them what I found 
and let them draw their own conclusions. 
Q. Tell who¥ 
A. Mr. Walker." 
As to his procedure generally in representing the 
company in respect to sales, Mr. Fredrickson testified on 
Page 19: 
"Q. And the person who bought the crib would 
order a specific crib. Is that correct 1 
A. That's right. 
Q. And on your order blank you would specify 
the particular crib that they wanted to buy¥ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you send that in to the company. Is that 
correct! 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now, what would happen after you sent this 
order to the company 1 
A. Well, most of the factory's shipments are 
based, of course, on orders or a back log of 
orders as they call it. As they receive an 
order, they place it on either the bottom of a 
file or top and, anyway, they work in se-
quence. They receive an order one day, and 
the order is scheduled for shipment the same 
day if there are no other orders preceding it, 
and then the item is boxed, packaged, and 
shipped directly to the party who ordered it. 
Q. Now, the crib that you sold then would be 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
shipped directly to the party who ordered the 
crib. Is that correct~ 
A. Oh, I would probably receive a notice, yes. 
Q. And what would happen with regard to the 
billing~ Would you receive a bill for the crib'~ 
A. No. 
Q. Would the person to whom you sold it receive 
that hill~ 
A. Yes." 
As to his authority to make collections, Mr. Fred-
rickson testified on Page 21: 
"Q. You get that notice, and do you have any 
follow-up to ascertain whether or not the 
cribs are paid for~ 
A. In the event that they weren't paid for with-
in a certain length of time, I would act at my 
own discretion. In other words, when you are 
selling a man something, he is a customer of 
yours, and you have got to determine which 
of those people you can approach and which 
you can't. It's a little insulting to ask a man 
for money at the time you are asking them for 
an order, so that is entirely up to the person's 
discretion. I am aware, however, of their 
current condition as far as payment is con-
cerned, but that is a standard practice by all 
factories and manufacturers. 
Q. And it is a standard practice of the Walker 
Manufacturing Company and prior to that 
the Tyre Manufacturing Company. Is that 
correct~ 
A. Oh, yes. 
12 
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Q. Now, if an account becan1e delinquent, would 
you go to the account and ask them about 
their delinquent account~ 
A. I never have. 
Q. Well, whether you have or not, would that fall 
within the scope of your authorization if you 
-in other words, let me put it this way: 
Suppose you sold-
A. The only person that can really logically ask 
for payment is the company themselves or 
the company's direct paid representatives. 
Now, you would fall in that category in the 
event that son1e party refused to pay; then 
the only thing they could do would be to ob-
tain counsel. 
Q. I'm not interested-
A. That is, an attorney. 
Q. -in this deposition in what the company can 
or can't do. All I am interested in is what you 
do . 
A. No, I can't do that. I can go and ask them, 
suggest to them that they pay their bill, and 
I can in no circumstance demand or insist 
that they pay it." 
As to the manner in which he was paid, he testified 
on Page 24: 
"A. I am paid a commission on all shipments. 
Q. And does that commission vary from item to 
item~ 
A. No, it's the same commission. 
Q. Can you tell us what that commission wa~ 
13 
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during 1952 at the time you worked for the 
Tyre-
A. Six per cent. 
Q. And what is it with Walker Manufacturing 
Company~ 
A. Six per cent. 
Q. Now, when would that be paid~ By that I 
mean would it Le paid to you immediately 
upon sending in the order blank~ 
A. No, that's paid on a monthly basis. 
Q. Now, would it make any difference when you 
were paid whether or not the person from 
whom you had solicited the order paid for it? 
A. That's right. 
Q. In other words, you wouldn't be paid until 
he had paid for the order that you had soli-
cited~ 
A. No, I am paid as soon as the order is shipped. 
You see, the dating is two per cent ten days 
as far as the company is concerned. The dat-
ing is two per cent ten days, which means that 
if the company that received the shipment 
paid for it in ten days, they would receive a 
two per cent discount. 
Q. And most of them do pay within ten days¥ 
A. Ordinarily, but then the terms are two per 
cent net thirty, and in thirty days when the 
account is due and payable they pay the net 
amount rather than the two per cent. 
Q. Suppose that a company from whom you had 
solicited an order on behalf of Walker Manu-
facturing Company or before that the Tyre 
14 
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Manufacturing Company failed to pay for the 
particular items which were included in that 
order. Would you receive a commission on 
those particular items~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Regardless of whether they pay for them or 
not~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. You receive your commission~ 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. So your commission is six per cent of the cost 
of the items on the orders solicited regardless 
of whether or not they are paid for or not~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now, do you have a discretion J,s to deciding 
who is a good credit risk or who isn't a good 
credit risk~ 
A. Yes, I am the sole judge. 
Q. In other words, you can refuse to sell to cer-
tain people, or you can decide to sell to other 
people~ 
A. That's right. To decide is more accurate 
there. As far as refusing a sale is concerned, 
no, I can't. If the particular company that 
I haven't called on decides that they wanted 
to buy something from them, they would go 
ahead and do it, and it would be up to the 
discretion of the factory whether or not they 
wanted to ship them." 
As to his authority to arrange for transfers of goods 
from one store to another in an emergency, Mr. Fred-
rickson had this to say: (Page 31) 
15 
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"Q. Now, do you ever have the situation arise 
in which maybe somebody needs something 
in a hurry, and one of your customers hap-
pens to have that particular item, and an-
other customer doesn't have that particular 
item and has a need for it, do you ever go to 
the one customer and pick that item up from 
that customer and take it over to the other 
customerf 
A. No. Something like that is handled between 
stores. In other words, if one of the stores 
here on Main Street was out of a particular 
item, they might know who else sold the same 
thing, and they would simply call them up 
and say, 'Joe, I need such and such. Have 
you got it to spare~' 
Q. Do they ever call you and ask if you know 
where they can get such and such~ 
A. Oh, no. 
Q. In other words, if they wanted to find out 
what other store in town handled the same 
equipment that they handle so they could call 
them and get it from them, would they ever 
call you and ask you who was handling this 
equipmentf 
A. They might, but it isn't likely. 
Q. Has that ever happened during the course of 
your time you have represented the Walker 
Manufacturing Company~ 
A. No. 
Q. Did that ever happen while you were repre-
senting the Tyre Manufacturing Company~ 
A. No. Quite possibly during the war that hap-
16 
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pened, but it certainly never happened while 
I have been working." 
Summarizing the testimony, Mr. Fredrickson testi-
fied on Page 33 : 
"Q. Now, I would like - let me ask you a question 
which is more or less of a summation, and ask 
you if it is true, or if it is not true, in which 
way it is not true. Do you see what I mean~ 
I understand your relationship with the 
Walker Manufacturing Company and before 
that the Tyre Manufacturing Company to be 
what you term as a manufacturer's repre-
sentative. Is that correct~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you are empowered, speaking particu-
larly now of the Walker Manufacturing Com-
pany and Tyre Manufacturing Company be-
fore, you are authorized- you are furnished 
by that company pictures and specifications, 
catalogs and brochures of the particular 
equipinent the company has sold~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you are also furnished a list of the prices 
of the particular equipment~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you are also furnished order blanks with 
the name of the company on the order blank 
and printed by the company itself. Is that 
correct~ 
A. Well, yes, but-
Q. You wouldn't necessarily have to take your 
orders on it~ 
A. No. 
17 
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Q. But you are furnished those order blanks~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Are you furnished any other statione_ry be-
sides order blanks~ 
A. No. 
Q. Then you would go to the particular customer 
that you felt that you might make a sale, and 
you would show him the brochures and the 
pictures of this equipment sold by the Walker 
Manufacturing Company or before that the 
Tyre Manufacturing Company. Is that cor. 
re.ct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you would tell them the price of the par-
ticular equipment that you were showing 
them~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if they desired to purchase that particu-
lar equipment, then you would make out an 
order ordinarily on the form published by the 
company. Is that correct? 
. 
A. Well, it just depends; would depend more on 
what I had rather than on the company's 
form. 
Q. But you would fill out this order then, 
whether it was on the company's order form 
or not~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you would send this order direct to the 
Walker Manufacturing Company or prior to 
that the Tyre Manufacturing Company~ 
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A. Yes. 
Q. In California. Now, as I understand it, they 
would ship the material that you specified 
on the order blank to the particular company. 
Is that correct~ 
A. The correction there would be what the deal-
er specified, not what I specified. 
Q. What the dealer had specified to you and you 
had put down on the order blank~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And they would ship that direct to the person 
involved. Is that correct~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they would-it has been your experience 
that they would ship it at the price that you 
quoted~ 
A. Well, that would be the price that they fur-
nished me with. 
Q. That's correct, but it is the price that the 
Walker Manufacturing Company furnished 
you with which you quoted to the consumer~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And at the time they shipped this material, 
they would send you some kind of a notice 
that the material had been shipped. Is that 
correct~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the notice that it had been shipped would 
include in the notice a statement of the price 
of the particular items. In other words, the 
price would be-the cost would be upon this 
notice~ 
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A. That's right. 
Q. Now, the Walker Manufacturing Company 
and before that the Tyre Manufacturing Com-
pany paid you six per cent of the sale price 
of the equip1nent that you sold. Is that cor-
rect~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was true regardless of whether or 
not the consumer paid for it or not~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And the company would in addition to that 
pay you six per cent of every order that was 
sent in for their equipment from the State 
of Utah, even though you yourself had not 
solicited the particular order~ 
A. That's right. Can I make a correction there~ 
Q. Yes, you may. 
A. When you say that I receive six per cent on 
all orders, that simply means that the order 
is shipped from the factory in good faith, and 
the company pays for it, then you see that 
is fine. That is simply entered on their credit 
books; but in the event that the company 
doesn't pay for it, I would already have re-
ceived my commission, but if the account 
proved faulty, then they would deduct the 
commission from that amount. 
Q. From other amounts that might be due to you. 
Is that it~ 
A. No. If there was no way of collecting it, they 
would deduct the commission from that. 
Q. And what would they do with the rest of it~ 
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A. Well, the rest of it, you see, I would have to 
stand good for selling a customer who 
wouldn't pay as well as the company. 
Q. In other words, the company would lose 
everything but the commission, and you would 
A. Yes, that's right. They would stand behind 
lose the commission~ 
that loss, and I would have to stand behind 
the loss of the con1mjssion. 
Q. Now, on small amounts, accounts of two or 
three hundred dollars-and we are still talk-
ing about the Walker Manufacturing Com-
pany and the Tyre Manufacturing Company, 
your authority for them-if one of your con-
sumers did not pay a bill, then, of course, 
you would have a discretion as to whether or 
not you might go around and talk to them 
about paying the bills~ 
:MR. HENDERSON: Are you asking a question 
or stating it~ 
Q. Well is that correct~ 
A. Well, yes. It's only at my own discretion 
because I am neither authorized nor re-
quested by the company to do these things. 
It is a case of cementing good business rela-
tions. 
Q. Could you go to the company and make some 
kind of a provision for payment~ In other 
words, suppose the company owed-a con-
sumer owed three hundred dollars, and you 
went to them. Could you arrange that they 
might pay that off a:t the sum of twenty-five 
dollars per month~ 
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A. No, only the company-that arrange1nent can 
be made only between the two c01npanies. 
Q. Could you discuss such an arrangement and 
then submit it to the company for approval1 
A. No. 
Q. Could you, if you went there and they said, 
'Yes, we owe the company three hundred dol-
lars, we have neglected to pay it, but here is 
the three hundred dollars,' could you accept 
'the three hundred dollars~ 
A. I would suggest that they mail it to them. I 
could take it and mail it myself, but it would 
only be a case of my doing it instead of them, 
my put~ing a six cent stamp on an envelope 
instead of them doing it, because that 
wouldn't accomplish anything. You can real-
ize that. 
Q. Now, you have never received any complaints 
from the customers or the customers' custo-
mers about any of the equipment that you 
have sold for Walker Manufacturing Com-
pany or before that the Tyre Manufacturing 
Company. Is that correct 1 
A. That's true, yes. 
Q. Now, it is your practice with these other com-
panies that you represent that if you do re-
ceive complaints that you you go to the custo-
mers, your customer's store and look over 
the equipment. Is that correct~ 
MR. HENDERSON: I object to tha:t. That's not 
his testimony, Mr. Hanson. It is suggesting, 
leading, and I object to the form of the ques-
tion. 
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Q. Do you want to tell me what you can do if 
you receive a complaint about some of this 
stuff that you sell? 
A. I believe that you will find a little bit further 
on that you asked this same question, and I 
told you at that time that I could only go to a 
customer's home, that is, a retail customer's 
home with representatives of the store or, 
that is, not one of their employe~es but one of 
the owners, and inspect it and then tell the 
factory exactly what I found, because I have, 
no authorization to recommend any change 
in tlie merchandise whatsoever. The only 
ones that can do it, it is between the two com-
panies." 
We have only quoted the most pertinent parts of 
the deposition a;s to the points involved. A reading of 
the entire deposition will disclose other testimony sup-
porting third party plaintiff's position, which we have 
not set out herein. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO. I 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY DID NOT 
ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THIRD PARTY DE-
FENDANT TO DISMISS THE THIRD PARTY ACTION UP-
ON THE GROUND THAT THE COURT LACKED JURIS-
DICTION OF SAID THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT AND 
THAT THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS VOID. 
POINT NO. II. 
SAID THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT DID STATE A 
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED TO 
THE THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE THIRD 
PARTY DEFENDANT. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY DID NOT 
ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THIRD PARTY DE-
FENDANT TO DISMISS THE THIRD PARTY ACTION UP-
ON THE GROUND THAT THE COURT LACKED JURIS-
DICTION OF SAID THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT AND 
THAT THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS VOID. 
While as stated in Parke-Davis Co. v. Fifth Judicial 
Court in Glnid for Beaver County, 93 Utah 217, 72 P2 466: 
"The mere solicitation and obtaining of or-
ders within a store by the agent of a foreign cor-
poration, for goods to be shipped into the state 
to the purchaser, does not amount to doj_ng busi-
ness within the state so as to render the corpora-
tion amenable to service of process therein." 
Very little more than mere solicitation is required 
to bring about this result. 
As stated in Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 77 U.S. 
A.P. D.C., 129, 134 F2 511 of 146 ALR 926: 
"The tradition crystallized when it was 
thought that nothing less than concluding con-
tracts could constitute 'doing business' by foreign 
corporations, an idea now well exploded. It is 
now recognized that maintaining many kinds of 
regular business activity constitutes 'doing busi-
ness' in 'the jurisdictional sense, notwithstanding 
they do not involve concluding contracts. In other 
words, the fundamental principle underlying the 
(doing business) concept seems to be the main-
tenance within the jurisdiction of a regular, con-
tinuous c'ourse of business activities, whether or 
not this includes the final stage of contracting. 
Consequently, it is clear that if, in addition to a 
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,~. 
regular course of solicitation, other business acti-
vities are carried on, such as maintaining a ware-
house, making deliveries, etc., the corporation is 
'present' for jurisdictional purposes. And very 
little more than 'mere solicitation' is required to 
bring about this result." (Italics their'S). 
Thus, 'in the case of Wabash Railroad Co. v. District 
Court, Salt Lake County, 109 Utah 526, 167 P2 973, where 
a railroad company which had no tracks west of the Mis-
souri River mainltained an office in Salt Lake City for 
the convenience of its general agent and assistant clerks 
and where the employees' only func'tion was to solicit 
shipments of freight by way of the Wabash Railroad 
from customers in the State of Utah; the employees 
having no authority to issue tickets, bills of lading, re-
ceipts, or t'O collect money, it was held that the corpo-
ration was doing business in the State of Utah. 
And in the case of Bristol v. Brent, 38 Utah 58, 110 
P. 556, the court held that the solicitation of freight busi-
nes's in the State of Utah, coupled wifu the maintenance 
of an office and an office force in this state, was doing 
business, even though the agent of the railroad company 
in the state had no power to bind the corporation in any 
of its business affairs. 
In the c;a:se of Industrial Commission v. J(emmerer 
Coal Co., 106 Ultah 476, 370 P2 373, the defendant, a Wy-
oming corporation, maintained an office in the State of 
Utah, on the door of which its name was printed; was 
listed in the telephone directory and all of the expenses 
of the office were paid by the defendant. The three 
employees who used that office solicited sales of coal 
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to consumers in the State of Utah; it was likewise held 
that the corpora!tion was doing business in the State of 
Utah. 
In a leading cas·e, International Harvester Co. v. 
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, the company's transactions in the 
State of Kentucky were conducted in accordance with the 
following order directed to persons negotiating sales for 
the company in the S'tate of Kentucky: 
"The company's transactions hereafter with 
the, people of Kentucky must be on a strictly in-
terstate commerce basis. Travelers negotiating 
sales must not hereafter have any headquarters 
or place of business in that state, but may reside 
'there. 
"Their authority must be limited to taking 
orders, and all orders must be taken subj·ect to 
the approval of the general agent outside of the 
S'tate, and all goods mus't be shipped from out-
side of the state after the orders have been ap-
proved. Travelers do not have authority to make 
a contract of any kind in the state of Kentucky. 
They merely itJake orders to be submitted to the 
general agent. If anyone in Kentucky owes the 
company a debt, they may receive the money, 
or a check or a draft for the same, but they do not 
have any rauthority 1tO make .any allowancer or com-
promise any disputed claims. When a matlter can-
not be s·ettled by payment of the amount due, the 
matter mus't be ·submitted to the general collecltion 
agent, as the case may he, for adjustment, and 
he can give the order as to what allowance or 
what compromise may be accepted. All conltracts 
of sale must be made f.o. b. from some point out-
side of Kentucky, and the goods become the prop-
erty of the purchaser when they are delivered to 
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the carrier outside of the sta'te. Notes for the pur-
chase price may be taken, and they may be made 
payable at any hank in Kentucky. All contracts 
of any and every kind made with the people of 
Ken'tucky must be made outside of thaJt state, and 
they will be contracts gorverned by the laws of the 
various states in which we have general agencies 
handling interstate business with the people of 
Kentucky. F'or example, contracts (585) made by 
the general agent at Parkersburg, W·est Virginia, 
will be West Virginia contracts. 
"If any one of the company's general agents 
deviates from what is stated in this letter, the 
result will he just the same as if all of them had 
done so. Anything that is done that places the 
company in the position where it can be held as 
having done business in Kentucky will not only 
make the man transaeting the business liable to a 
fine of from $100.00 to $1,000.00 for each offense, 
but it will make the company liable for doing busi-
ness in the state without complying with the re-
quirements of the laws of the state. We will 
therefore depend upon you to se1e that these in-
structions are strictly carried out." 
The court held that 'the mere solici'ta'tion of sales, 
coupled with a continuous course of business within the 
state was sufficient to confeT jurisdiction on the State 
of Kentucky and said: 
"Here was a continuous course of business in 
the solici'tation of orders which were g,ent to an-
other s1tate, and in response to which the ma-
chine's of the Harvester Company were delivered 
within the State of Kentucky. This was. a oourse 
of business, not a single transaction. The agents 
not only s·ol'icited orders ( 586) in Kentucky, but 
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might there rece~ve payrnent in money, checks, 
or drafts. They might take notes of customers, 
which notes were made payable, and doubtless 
were collected, at any bank in Kentucky. This 
course of conduct of authorized agents within the 
state in our judg1nenrt constituted a doing of busi-
ness th€re in such wise that the Harvester Com-
pany might be fairly said to have been the!re, do--
ing business, and amenable to the process of the 
courts of the state." 
I1t i:s to be noited that the agent's authority under 
the cit:ed order or metllod of do'ing business is synony-
mous with the agent's .authority in the matter now under. 
cornsiderati'on. 
A case particularly in point is the. case of Inter-
national Shoe Company v. State, et al (Wash.), decided 
January 4, 1945, 154 P2 801. In that case the Interna-
tional Shoe Company employed eleven to thirteen sal'es-
men who re1sided in the State of Washington and were 
regularly engaged therein in soliciting orders and dis-
playing sampl1e,s, someltimes in permanenlt display rooms, 
which were paid for by the salesmen, for which expense 
they were reimbursed by the company. Quoting from the 
case: 
"The authority of the salesmen is limited to 
exhibiting to merchants who are probably buyers 
samples of merchandise for wlrich they solicit or-
ders, endeavoring to procure orders on prices 
.and terms fiX'ed by appellant. If orders are ob-
t,ained, ifue salesmen transmit them to appellant's 
office in St. Louis, for acceptance or rejection. 
If the orders. are accepted by appellant, the mer-
chandise called for by such orders is shipped 
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.\{ 
f.o.b. shipping point, from outside the state of 
W ashingt'on. No sralesman has authority to bind 
appellant with any contract, or to finally conclude 
any transacti~on in its behalf, nor can he make 
collections. Sal,esmen are not permiltted 1to engage 
in an independently established trade occupation, 
professiion, or business of the s'ame nature as is in-
volved in their ·employment by appellant." 
The court held ~hat se,rvice of summons on orne of 
the salesman was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon 
the tribunals of the State of \V ashington, and said: 
"The cases deraling with the questliorn herre 
presented are multitudinous. While it is probably 
true that mos1t of the cases which hold the corpora-
tion was doring business in the state: so as to make 
it am.enable to process have some slight activity 
on the part of the agenrt in addit:i!on to the solici-
tation of orders resutting in a con'tinuous flow of 
the corporatiron's products into the state, yet it 
seems to us the basic fact upon which the courts 
have determined that the corporation was doing 
business was the regular and systema:tic solicita-
tion of orders by the agent, resulting in the con-
tinuous fl.o,w of the corporation's products into the 
state by means of interstate carriers. 
"The following are typicral cases holding that 
the corporation was doing business in the state 
where service was attempted to be made. Fvom 
our discussion of these caS'es will appear what 
facts, in addition to mere solicitation, the courts 
considered in determining that the corpora:tion 
was doing business in the state. It will also a p-
pear f~om some of the decisions that a regular 
and systematic course of solicitation of orders 
by the agent of the corporation, resulting in a con-
tinuous flow rof the corporation's product's into the 
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staJte should be and is sufficient to warrant the 
court in holding the corporation was doing busi-
ness in the state." (Italics theirs.) 
The following is f·ound in 113 A.L.R. 88: 
"In a grea;t majority of the cases in which the 
question has been presented, the courts have sus-
tained the validity of service of process upon a 
sales agent or solicitor for a foreign corporation 
doing business in the state. 
"Thus service of summons upon a salesman of 
a foreign corporation who took orders for its 
goods from retail merchants was held to be valid 
under a statute authorizing service on 'any offi-
cer or agent of such a corporation within this 
state.' Genack v. Gorman, (1923) 224 Mich. 79, 
194 NW 575. 
"And ~an agent with authority to solicit orders 
for goods to be shipped from outside the state, 
and who was designated by the corporation's offi-
cials as its 'western representative', was held to 
be an agent of the corporation upon whom proeess 
could be served." Kirby v. Louismann-Capen Co., 
(1914; D.C.) 221 F. 267. 
* * * 
"A local agent employed by a foreign auto-
mobile manufacturing to take orders for cars on 
blank forms furnished by ·the company, on which 
the agent's name appeared as salesman, who took 
checks payabl·e to the company in payment for 
the cars, and received compensation on a commis-
sion basis, was held to he an agent of the corpora-
tion, upon whom process could be s·erved." R. M. 
Owen & Co. v. Johnson (1913) 184 Ill. App. 90. 
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.I.', 
Ill 
"An employee of a foreign corporation who, 
in addHion to soliciting orders f'or the corpora-
tions' goods, subject to a.pproiV'al by the eorpora-
tion in ano1ther state and shipments from the other 
state, a1s'O made collections, adjusted claims, filled 
orders by se-curing goods from other purchasers, 
and kept s'ome of the corporations' goods in stock 
aJt his home for immediate delivery, was held to 
be an agent under whom process could be served 
unde'r a statute authorizing service upon ''any offi-
cer or agent of such corporation' and providing 
that any pers,on representing such 'a c'orporotion 
in any eapacity should be deemed an 'agent' within 
the meaning of the s'tatute-." Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. 
Co. ( 1932) 20 Mich. 496, 245 NW 503. 
"One who, in solici'ting orde,rs for t'he product 
of a for~eign corporation, eonsulted wi1th the eorpo- . 
ration ~and undertook to remedy defects when the 
equipment sold did not function properly, install-_, 
ed such equipment with other emp1o~ees of the 
corporati,on who came for the purpose of correct-
ing such difficulties, and purchased fabricated 
materials in the state for use in attempts to 
remedy defects, was held to, be an agent upon 
whom process could be served, under a statute 
auifuorizing service upon any officer or agent of a 
£oreign corpor,ation, and providing that any per-
son representing such a corporation in any capa-
city silrould be deemed an agent." Malooly v. New 
York Heating atnd Ventilating Corp. (1935) 270 
M'ich. 240, 258 NW 622 (appeal dism:i:ssed in 
1935); 296 U.S. 533, 80 L. Ed. 379; 56 S. Ct. 92, 
which bad re!hearing denied in 1935; 296 U.S. 662; 
80 L. Ed. 4 71, 56 S. Ct. 166.) 
* * * 
"A pers~on who solicited business fior a f!o~-
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eign building and loan association, receipted for 
and re1nitted installments, dues and fine1s on a 
commission basis, and was held out by the corpo-
I'Iation as its agent at the place where he was 
served, was held to be the 'resident agent' of the 
eorporation upon whom process might be served." 
Pollock v. Carolina Interstate Bldg. & Loan Assoc. 
(1896) ; 48 S.C. 65; 25 S.E. 977; 59 Am. St. Rep. 
695. 
* * * 
"A traveling salesman who solici'ted orders 
for goods on behalf of a foreign corporat~on, to 
be shipped from another state, subject to approval 
by the corporaJtion at its home office in such state, 
was held to he an agent upon who~m process could 
he serv-ed in an action against the corpor,ation." 
Harbich v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. (1932 D.C.) 
11 F. Supp. 63. 
"And service upon an agent of a foreign cor-
poration whos:e duties were to solicit sales of the 
eorporat~on's products throughout the state, at 
pr'ices fixed by 'the corpor-ation and subject to ap-
proval by the corporation at its hom·e office, and 
who received a monthly salary for his services, 
was held to he sufficient." Duluth Log Co. V· 
Pulpwood a~. (1917) 137 Minn. 312, 163 NW 520. 
The 'agent Fredrickson in this cas'e has represen'ted 
the Walker Manufacturing Company and its predecessor, 
who has done business in this st·ate on a continued basis 
:ror a number of years. His function is not merely to soli-
cit sales, although thaJt is a part of his dutie·s, but he is. 
designated by the company as their agent here in 'the 
state of Ut.ruh. While he has no authority to make any 
binding contraclts on their behalf he represents their 
busliness interests in th1s state. He n1ay be called upon 
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by the company t1o eoHect accounts. He m~ay be called 
upon by the company or their customers to investigalbe 
complain't1s and make a report of the S!ame to the com-
pany. Tnere can be no doubt fuat under the CJases ~assign­
ed his repres'entation is of such a character that the com-
pany is doting business under Rule 4 of the Ut:ah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and that serVice upon Hadand Fredrick-
son is sufficient to confer jurisdicltion over the third 
party defendant Walker Manufacturing Oompany upon 
this court. 
POINT NO. II. 
SAID THIRD PARTY ·COMPLAINT DID STATE A 
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED TO 
THE THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE THIRD 
PARTY DEFENDANT. 
As was pOiill!ted out previously, the t!hird party de-
fendant and appellant did not raise the polint that 'the 
th'ird party CJomp~aint did not allege facts enti'tling the) 
third p~rty plaintiff to relief a't the time the case was in 
the District Court and this· appeal, which is from an in-
terl'ocutory deci~sion of the court, was allowed only on 
those matters raised under 'the first point. This fact 
alone should dispose of the point; however, the following 
authorities are cited should the court desire to review 
them: 
Rule 14(a) of 'the Ut1ah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
"Before the service o.f his answeT ~a defendant 
may move ex parte or, ·after the service of his 
answer, on notice to 'tihe pJ!aint:iff, foT leave as a 
third-party p~alintiff to serve a summons and com-
33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plaint upon a person not a party to the action who 
is or may be l'i'able to him for all or part of the 
plaintiff's claim against him. If the motion is 
granted and the summons and compl1aint are serv-
ed, the person so served, hereinafter ooHed the 
third party defendant, shall make his defenses to 
the third party plaintiff's claim as provided in 
Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third 
party plaintiff ·and cross-claim's against other 
third party defendants as provided in Rule 13. 
The third-pa:rty defendant may also ass'ert any 
cl·ati.m against the pl'aintiff arising out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matte:r of the plaintiff's claim against the third 
party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any 
cla1im 'against 'tfue third party defendant arising 
out of the trans,action or occurrence ~hat is the 
subject mrutter of the plaintiff's claim agaJinstt the 
iliird party p~a:intiff, and the third-party defend-
ant thereupon shall assert his defenS"es as prO-
vided ill Rule 12 and his counterclaims and cross-
claims as provided in Rule 13. A third-party de-
f·endanJt may p:r'oceed under this rule against any 
person not a party to the action who is or may be 
Ii1able to him for 'all or part of the claim made in 
the action against the third-party defendant." 
rt is ordinarily true, as was sraid by Justice Henri 
Henri'Od in Hardm(Jffl. v. Matthews, (Utah) 262 P2 748, 
't!hat j1oiinlt !tort feasors cannot be interplead underr th!is 
rule 'in tlhe abS'ence of a statute permitting contribution 
between them. H01wever, this is not the situation in this 
CJa.se. 
In this caJs,e, the third party complaint is not based 
upon any right of contributiOIJl between joint tort feaJS,ors 
but on the right of indemnity. 
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i ~ 
.l 
Assuming the facts of plaintiff'·s compl1aint and the 
allegations of the third party complaint to be correct, 
as we mus,t do at this point for the purpose of testing 
the vtalidity of the pleadings, we are confronted with 
this ·s~tuaJili.ron : The defendant and third par,ty p~amtiff 
'Sold to the p}ain~iff 'a baby crib which wa1s defeetive. 
Th~s defective condi~on should, if we are to believe the 
plaintiff, have he.en known to the defendant and third 
party p~aJinlffiff. If we stop alt this point, the:re· is no 
ground for relief ·agalinst the third party deferrdant, the 
manufacturer; however, if we assume, as alleged in the 
thlird party complaint, that ·ifue defective c;orndiftion wrus 
either the result of the manu:racturer's de~sign of the crib 
or e:A'i!s.t~d .at the time the crib was sold by the manu-
facturer, ·and that the manuf'acturer should have known 
of or discovered the condition, then the third party plain-
tiff would he en't'iltled to bring a suit against the third 
party defendant for the damages suffered by re,asron of 
said defective dersign or condition. Those dama.gers would 
be me1a1sured by the recovery of the plaintiff in tlre first 
actJirorn. The action agalinst the manuflacturer would no't 
be one based on 'any right of contribution between joint 
tort feasors. but rather would be one of indemnity based 
upon the manuflaclturer's express or implied warranties 
of s·ale. T'hii1s i's exactly the situation presented by the 
pleadlin~s 'in th'i·s case except 'that the two actions have 
been made <me under the procedure authorized by Rule 
14('a) of 'tfue Utah Rules of Civil PI"ocedure. 
Rul·e 14(a) of the Utah Rule's of Civil Procedure is 
e1eactly the s'ame as Rule 14('a) 'of the Federal Rule1s. of 
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Procedure. Under the Federal Rules of Procedure, it 
hrus heen heid that a defendant sued for dam-ages for the 
negligent operation of an elevator may assert a claim 
against •a tird party defendant for defective co!IliStruc-
tJion of sa£ety devices. Tomko v. City Bank Farmers 
Trust Co., D.C.N.Y. 1943, 3 F.R.D. 31. 
Under the F~ederal Rule, itt hrus al1so been held that 
where pl·aintiff, injured while employed as grain shover 
on a boat being unloaded at defendant's elevator in New 
York, all'eged negligence in that a hook broke causing 
plaintffi.ff to be struck by a shovel, def'endant wa.s entitled 
to fil·e third party complaint ·against manufacturer of 
hook, since manuf,acturer occupied po:sition of indemnitor 
to def·endant and manufacturer's liability to defendant 
was bas·ed upon breach of implied warranty. Tevington 
v. International Milling Co·, D.C.N.Y. 1947, 71 Fed. Supp. 
621. 
An analogous s~1tua:tion exists where a retailer sued 
by a consumer for breach of implied warranty of whole-
somenesls or fitne1s1s of food, seeks to bring in as a party 
defendant the wholesaler orr manufacturer from whom 
the food was procured. There is an annotation in 24 
ALR ( 2) 913, from which the f.oUowing is taken : 
"While there wa·s no meaills under common-
law procedure. whereby a defendant could bring 
into the action a third person liable over to or 
severaHy with the defendant upon the causes of 
acUon being litigated, statutets and rules of prac-
tice have been enacted in a numbe·r of jurisdlic-
tionJs providling that when a defendant shows fuat 
some th'ird person, not then a party to the action, 
may be nl:one lrable, or liable over to the defend-
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,, ant, or jointly and severally liable with him, on 
the cause of action sued upon, t:he court may order 
such person brought in a;s a par~ty defendant. 
"There are a few ca:ses dealing with the spe-
cific question of the right of a retailer sued by a 
consumer for breach of implied warranty of 
whole1someness or fitne'S's of food or drink, to 
bring in a1s party defendant the wholesaler or 
manufacturer from whom the article was pro-
cured, but the trend establ1'shed by them :ts, clear-
ly, that unde~r modern practice statutes such an 
impleader rs proper.'' 
A number of cases from the jur~sdiction of North 
Oarolina, New York and the United S't!a:tes OourtJs sup-
porting this proposition are set out therein. 
In DuRt'te Laundry, Inc. v. Washington Electric Co., 
Inc·, et al, 33 N.Y.S. 925, an action wrus brought against 
the seller for breach of contract because of defects there-
in. The original defendant sought to implead a;s an addi-
tional defendant the cmnpany engaged t1o inspect equip-
ment before purchase thereof by original defendant from 
the m·anufacturer. It was held: 
''VVhere any party to an action sihows tlrat 
some third person, no:t then a party to the action, 
is or will be lrable to such party wh!oUy ·or in part 
for the claim made against such party in the ac-
ti~on, the court . . . may order such person to be 
brought in a;s a party to the action and dir·ect that 
a supplemental summons and a pleading ... be 
served upon such person." Subdiv. 2, Sec. 193, 
Oivil Practice Act. "The Electric Company may 
imple~ad the Irrspecfiom. Oompany as a party a1s its 
cross-complaint shows a right to recover wholly 
or in part any amount for which it i·s liable to 
the Laundry Oompany." 
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A diffe-rent approach was taken in McLa.ughlin v. 
City of Syracuse, 56 N.Y.S. 594. There a city was sued 
by a pedestrian struck by ice falling from the roof of a 
building. The city moved to make the property owners 
defendants. It was held the 1nofion should have been 
granted. The court s·aid: 
"We are well acquainted with the rule that a 
joint t01rt-fe1asor ordin1arily may not be brought in 
on the applicrution of a defendant unles's the plain-
tiff consents ... but there are exceptions to 'Such 
ru1e and the exceptions are well expressed in 
Truste,~s of Village of Oonandaigua v. Foster, 81 
Hun. 147, 149, 150; 30 N.Y.S. 686, 687 ' ... First 
where the party claiming indemn!ity has not been 
guilty of ·any fiau1t except technically or construc-
'tively, rus where an innocent maste-r is held to re-
·spond f'or the tort of his servant, acting within 
the scope of ID'S e1nployn1ent; or second, where 
both partre's have been in fault, but nort in tili.e 
same fiau1't, towards the person injured, and the 
fau1t 'Orf the party from whom indemnity is claim-
ed wa:s the primary and efficient cause of tihe 
injury. Illu'strartions of the second clruss were 
foun'd in cruses, like the present: 'of recovery 
agia!ihst municipalities for obstructions to the 
highways cau'sed by private persons. The fault 
of the latter rs the creation of the nuisance; th'at 
of 'the former, the failure to re.move it, in the ex-
ercise of 'iijs duty to care for the safety of public 
s'treerts. The first was, a positive tort, and the effi-
cient c·ause of the injury complained ·of; the latter, 
the negative tort of neglect to act upon notice, 
expres·s or implied.'" 
In the case at bar, the thlrd party defendant, assum-
ing the aUegations orf 'tihe complaints to be true, would he 
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L 
required to indemnify the defendant for any damages 
the plaintiff migHt recover ag~ainsrt defendant. ills, the 
iiliird party defendant's negligence was t!he p01sltive and 
the effective cause of the injury. The negligence of de-
fendant wa;s negative; that is, the failure to discover 
the defec't. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus it is seen, under the plea:dings the third party 
defend!an:t would be liable to the defendant for any dam-
age plaintiff might recover, nort 10n the theory of con-
structiion but on tili:e theory of inde:Illllity. The third 
party is 'therefore a proper party to be brought into 
the action under Rule 14(a) of the Ut!ah Rule1s of Civil 
Procedure. Service was had upon the third party de-
fendant by service upon h~s agent Hadand Fredrickson, 
I 
and the court 'has jurisdiction over h'im. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANSON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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